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Abstract 
The transformation in prevailing conceptualisations of property and the drive to render land as 
fungible as possible, the desire to commoditise land that had been pursued in earnest since the 
17th century in England, was realised in the space of the settler colony decades before it would be 
implemented in the U.K. The author explores how the commodity logic of abstraction that 
subtended new property logics during this time, reflected in the Torrens system of title by 
registration was accompanied by a racial logic of abstraction that rendered the land of the 
Native, or Savage vacant and ripe for appropriation. By way of conclusion, the author 
speculates on the ways in which the imposition of English property law in the settler colony 







Robert Richard Torrens, the primary supporter and on some accounts, primary 
architect of the land registration system that came to be known as the Torrens 
system, wrote passionately about the unsuitability of English land law for the 
colonies: 
Possibly, some… may concur with me in regarding it as altogether too 
splendid and ingenious a work of art to suit either our means or our 
requirements in these colonies; that, like those exquisite carvings in ivory 
which we see marshalled in order in some recess or cabinet of a lady’s 
boudoir, but never drawn out when the game of chess is really to be played, 
the proper place for this “splendid code” is the cabinet of the antiquary, where 
those who have leisure and a taste for that sort of thing, may admire this 
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‘proof of the vast powers of the human intellect, however vainly or preposterously 
employed’ [quoting from Blackstone]. In playing out the game of life in this 
work-a-day part of the globe, we require something less costly, something 




In making the case for the adoption of a system of title by registration in the colony 
of South Australia, Torrens wrote with near delirium about the opportunity for 
property law reform presented by a place that was unencumbered by a landed 
English aristocracy and the remnants of a feudal property regime. This place was 
also, in the minds of English colonists, quite conveniently free of a population with 
recognisable pre-existing ownership of the land. The transformation in prevailing 
conceptualisations of property and the drive to render land as fungible as possible, 
the desire to commoditise land that had been pursued in earnest since the 17th 
century2, could be realised in this vacant land so much more easily than in England 
itself. While Australia was a place initially identified as the perfect host for those 
elements of British society who were expelled on the basis of their criminality, the 
export of the raw materials (such as sheep) that were required for the maintenance 
of a pastoralist economy3 would eventually give way to a more agriculturally 
intensive economy. As I explore in this article, colonial settlement in Australia 
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1 Torrens, Notes on a System of Conveyancing by Registration of Title (with instructions for the guidance of 
parties dealing, illustrated by copies of the books and forms in use in the land titles office (Adelaide: Register and 
Observer General Printing Office, 1859) p.4 
 
2 E.P Thompson, Customs in Common (London:  New Press, 1992); E. Meiksins Wood Liberty and 
Property: A Social History of Western Political Thought from the Renaissance to Enlightenment (London: 
Verso, 2011)  
3 See Sarah Franklin, Dolly Mixtures: The Remaking of Genealogy (London: Duke University Press, 
2007) 119-129 
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required a place that was outside of the space and time of English relations of 
ownership, where new forms of land holding could be imposed with relative ease.  
 
* * * 
 
 
Alain Pottage has argued in meticulous fashion that the system of title by 
registration inaugurated with the 1925 Law of Property Act in the UK, and 
subsequent to that, the 1930 Land Registration Rules relating to conveyancing, 
embodied a “logic of registration” that replaced the property logic of contract and 
conveyance. Registration “superimposed” a new sequence onto practices of 
conveyancing, which essentially re-ordered primary elements of the old scheme 
“according to a new grammar of property.”4 This new grammar of property gave 
expression to an increasingly abstract concept of ownership. Long-held 
justifications for and practices of ownership that were based on possession and use 
gave way to an affective5 grounding of ownership rooted in expectation and the 
desire for security. Property ownership came to be defined by these abstract 
qualities and required different legal forms and techniques, such as title by 
registration, to structure and realise newly configured relations of exchange and 
modes of alienation. Pottage has traced the rules and practices of conveyancing, 
and the cartographic techniques that were essential to the transformation in land 
holding that title by registration inaugurated. Significantly, he illuminates how the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Alain Pottage, “The Originality of Registration” in 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 371-401 at 377 
5 The term affective is used here to denote the sentiments, emotions and sensibilities that come to 
explicitly ground justifications for ownership in the work of Bentham, Blackstone and others; 
namely, desires, expectations, and fear of loss and insecurity. For an excellent discussion of how 
affect operates in contemporary Canadian settler colonial property relations, to engender a sense 
of entitlement and expectation to property ownership among settler communities, see Eva 
Mackey, “(Un)Settling Expecations: (Un)certainty, Settler States of Feeling, Law and 
Decolonization” (2014) Canadian Journal of Law and Society   
4	  	  
co-existence of two different forms of registration (in relation to mortgages, for 
instance) during a long transitional phase from one paradigm of ownership to 
another exposed the distrust that property owners had of this new logic of 
registration, which in their eyes, created a form of ownership of real property that 
lacked reality. A registered owner of a mortgage charge was understood to be a 
“person with power,” but bereft of a legal estate in the property. Actual possession 
of the title deeds by the mortgagee, deeds that signified ownership, was being 
displaced by a bureaucratic and abstract representation of ownership interests in an 
administrative archive. The co-existence of a system in which the mortgagee took 
the registered charge and also held the mortgage off register, was “[c]onsistent with 
the idea that registration involved the construction of fictitious ownership.”6  In 
order to more fully understand the nature of the abstract fictions that come to 
define modern concepts of property, I depart from a concept of abstraction 
influenced by a Weberian discourse that focuses on the role of a faceless, sanitised 
bureaucracy and administration in the emergence of modern property law, and 
draw on Pashukanis’ theory of the legal form. I utilise Pashukanis’ work to explain 
why title by registration became the most appropriate legal technique7 to facilitate 
the shift from predominantly feudal conceptualisations of land to modern forms of 
property. As I argue below, the settler colony of South Australia was the ideal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 ibid, pp381-382 
7 What does it mean to speak of legal techniques? Timothy Mitchell, writing about processes 
involved in the fabrication of the concept of ‘economy’ writes of the “mixtures of what are called 
real and representation, thing and value, or object and idea. In fact, it would be impossible to 
hold them apart according to such a distinction…Our world is made up of technical bodies, 
hybrids that are neither wholly objects nor ideas, more than just things but not disembodied 
spirits (hence appearing as crystallized spirit), not properly divisible into nature and culture, or 
reality and representation.” (Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity 
(London: University of California Press, 2002) 116-117).  The concept of legal technique allows 
one to expose and unfold the processes that make or constitute legal artefacts, de-naturalising 
distinctions between subject and object, person and thing, material and ideational, which 
property laws tend to assume and rely upon. See Alain Pottage “Introduction: The Fabrication of 
Persons and Things” in Alain Pottage and Martha Mundy eds. Law, Anthropology and the 
Constitution of the Social: Making Persons and Things (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004)  
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space for the imposition or trialling of this technique, treated as it was, as a terra 
nullius. 
This article analyses the transformation in conceptualisations of ownership 
that found expression in the system of title by registration known as the Torrens 
system. While the myriad factors involved in the history of land reform in England 
during the 19th century is inevitably complex and irreducible to any singular causal 
explanation, I seek to focus on one particular aspect of this transformation: the 
logic of abstraction that shaped a new grammar of property ownership, and 
consequently, the legal form of property that emerges during the 19th century in 
Britain and its colonial possessions.8 In addition to this commodity logic of 
abstraction, there is another form of abstraction that facilitated the imposition of a 
system of title by registration in its first instantiation, in the colony of South 
Australia. That a system of title by registration was first imposed in the colony of 
South Australia by English colonists was no accident. The racial abstraction 
embodied in the figure of the Savage or Native was realised in the doctrine of terra 
nullius, which enabled English settlers to impose the Torrens system of registration 
first in South Australia, and then elsewhere. Developments in the law of 
conveyancing, and the form of land ownership that was imposed in the colony of 
South Australia some 70 years prior to being fully implemented in the UK, were 
premised upon the particular visions of both property and race that the colonists 
carried with them to South Australia. Governed by a logic of abstraction, the land 
was understood as a commodity without any owners, to be claimed, partitioned, 
securitised, and cultivated. The indigenous peoples who had lived on the land for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For analysis of the imposition of a system of title by registration in colonial Bengal, see R. Guha, A 
Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1981); for Mandate Palestine, see Zeina B. Ghandour A Discourse on Domination in Mandate 
Palestine: Imperialism, Property and Insurgency (London: Routledge, 2007)  
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thousands of years prior to the arrival of Europeans were understood as a primitive 
race, which would vanish from the landscape, and failing that, could be salvaged 
through assimilation. The counterpart to the alchemical nature of conjuring 
fictitious value in land as a commodity was the burgeoning pseudo-scientific 
classifications of race and racial difference. Echoing earlier movements of enclosure 
in England and Wales, title by registration functions during the 19th century as a 
technique of dispossession in the settler colony.  
Contemporary social theory is awash with different forms and logics of 
abstraction.9 Drawing inspiration from Marx’s concept of real abstraction, I 
examine the historical and social conditions of settler colonialism in South 
Australia, and the particular legal technique of title by registration that facilitated 
the realisation of land in its abstract form as a commodity. Marx’s notion of “real 
abstraction” reflects a passage, as Toscano writes, “from [a] fundamentally 
intellectualist notion of abstraction… to a vision of abstraction that, rather than 
depicting it as a structure of illusion, recognizes it as a social, historical, and trans-
individual phenomenon.”10 In this case, land as a commodity and the abstract figure 
of the Savage co-emerge from the social and historical grounds of settler 
colonialism.  
The article is structured in two parts. In the first part, I discuss registration 
as the primary legal technique that facilitates the transition to an abstract concept 
of ownership. I also analyse the theories of ownership that informed changes in the 
legal form of property, primarily through the work of Jeremy Bentham. I then 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 See for instance, Toscano’s thorough exploration of the way in which abstraction functions in the 
work of Whitehead, Stengers, and Marx in “The Culture of Abstraction” in Theory, Culture and 
Society, (2008) 25: 57.  
10 A. Toscano, “The Open Secret of Real Abstraction” in Rethining Marxism: A Journal of Economics, 
Culture and Society (2008) Vol. 20 No. 2, p273-287, at 275.  See also Jordana Rosenberg, Critical 
Enthusiasm: Capital Accumulation and the Transformation of Religious Passion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011) 22-25 
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explore how envisioning South Australia as a space and time outside of English 
relations of ownership, as a terra nullius, fuelled and facilitated the imposition of the 
Torrens system. In the second part, I examine the racial abstractions that were 
central to the vision of the land as free and fungible of its inhabitants. By way of 
conclusion, I speculate on the place of the settler colony in the reform of English 
land law, leading to the reforms of the 1925 Land Registration Act which finally saw 
the imposition of a system of title by registration throughout England and Wales.  
  
A TECHNIQUE OF OWNERSHIP, A TECHNIQUE OF 
DISPOSSESSION: TITLE BY REGISTRATION 
 
i. Registration  
Sir Robert Richard Torrens was born in 1814, in Cork, the son of Colonel Robert 
Torrens, the Chairman of the Colonisation Commissioners. Torrens had no legal 
training whatsoever, making the fact that the land title system that has spread like a 
virus throughout much of the Commonwealth bears his name ever so slightly 
ironic. Robert Torrens sailed for South Australia in 1840 and was elected to the 
Parliament of South Australia in April 1857, largely because he campaigned on a 
platform of conveyancing reform.11 He was to become the third premier of South 
Australia in that same year, and worked tirelessly to promote the wholesale reform 
of the conveyancing system.  Introduced as a private member’s bill in 1858, The Real 
Property Act eventually came into force at the beginning of July in that same year.  
Prior to moving to South Australia, Robert Torrens worked as a landing 
waiter in the Port of London, and once he had arrived in Australia, was appointed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Greg Taylor, The Law of the Land: the advent of the Torrens system in Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2008) 24 
8	  	  
as a Custom’s Officer in the Port of Adelaide. It was at the Customs’ Department 
that he gained experience of the shipping system, where funded property was 
bought and sold within a system of registration. Working with a system of property 
that was funded rather than landed, Torrens was to gain an acute appreciation of 
the similarities in forms of moveable and fixed property. The system of registration 
for land title that was introduced into South Australia was in part modelled on the 
system of registration of the Hanseatic states of Germany, and Torrens relied upon 
the expertise of his German collaborator Hübbe in no small measure.  
His formative experiences with the system of registration employed by the 
shipping industry influenced Torrens’ vision of landed property as a commodity, 
abstracted from prior relations of ownership, and to whatever degree possible, from 
particular and individualised characteristics or traits. One of the many objections to 
a system of registration for land titles was that unlike funded property, landed 
property was subtended by the facts of occupation, possession, and individual 
characteristics that required special attention in the selling and purchasing of land. 
It is in response to these objections that Torrens elaborates on what he sees as the 
likenesses between funded property and landed property.12  
The process by which property comes to be seen in abstract terms, both 
generally and specifically is typified by Torrens’ comments on the similitude 
between fixed and moveable property. Torrens wrote that “this objection on the 
score of difference in essential attributes disappears like a mirage upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Torrens wrote: “If the comparative indivisibility in land constitutes a difficulty, it exists in a yet 
greater degree in a ship. Here also we find the characteristic of individuality. We must identify the 
particular ship to be transferred by a long description in the register. Here again the contingency of 
adverse possession requires to be guarded against. Finally the attribute of immobility renders 
transfer by registration more suitable for that description of property than for shipping which may 
be removed beyond the ken and jurisdiction of the registering officer; yet the transfer and 
encumbrance of shipping property through the instrumentality of registration has given universal 
satisfaction, ensuring certainty, simplicity and economy.” Torrens, The South Australian System of 
Conveyancing by Registration of Title, (Adelaide, 1859)  (10-11)	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investigating closely the nature of property in shipping”.13  He argued that like 
land, a ship is even more indivisible, and also bears the trait of individuality. He 
also argued that registration was even more suitable for immobile property as 
compared to that which is shipped, as the latter “may be removed beyond the ken 
and jurisdiction of the registering officer…”.14  Torrens refuted the notion that 
there are material differences between land and funded property, and argued that 
land is essentially the same, for purposes of conveyancing, as intangible and/or 
mobile forms of property. He quotes from J.S. Mill who remarked, “to make land 
as easily transferrable as stock would be one of the greatest economical 
improvements which could be bestowed upon the country.”15  
Registration was a necessity in the shipping trade because in order to be 
transferred, ships had to be identified by a long description in the register.16 The 
shipping registers kept by Customs Officers reflect a system of recording in the 
form of a legal register that emerged as a form of writing as early as the 13th 
century. Entry books emerged as a form of record keeping that stood somewhere 
between the official rolls and the literary treatises connected to them: 
 
Here, as in other branches of record-making, the 
Exchequer was the pioneer. In the two Black Books and in 
the Red Book of the Exchequer we have perhaps the 
earliest instances of this kind of compilation. In later times 
the example of the Exchequer was extensively followed… 
From the period of the Restoration the War Office 
possesses a series of entry books. Many corporate towns 
made similar collections; and the great landowners, lay and 
ecclesiastical, possessed registers and cartularies which 
were used for their possessions in the same manner as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Torrens, op cit 10-11 
14 ibid 
15 Ibid, 43 
16 ibid, 10-11 
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official publication were used for the department of state to 
which they referred.17  
 
The register, as a form of record keeping emerges as one means of creating social 
and legal facts. Registers recorded surrenders of land to the Crown, along with 
copies of statutes, state papers and other public documents that related to the 
activities and jurisdiction of the Exchequer. By the time of the 18th century, 
registers record all manner of transactions that relate to various state departments. 
Significantly for my purposes, it is interesting to note the primary place of registers 
in colonial governance. In registers produced by colonial administrators and 
customs officers, everything from each bushel of wheat that was produced in the 
British North American colonies and imported into Britain, to the number of 
tonnes of cotton exported from India, to parcels of land carved up for sale in the 
colony of Australia, were recorded in registers and thus became a crucial 
instrument in creating colonial taxonomies of productivity, income and 
expenditure. The laws of the Customs, as they related to shipping, navigation and 
revenue are digested in successive tomes that detail in the form of a register the 
revenue collected from the importation of each and every item that was arriving by 
ship from the colonies and elsewhere.18 
The registers for shipping, with which Torrens would have been well 
acquainted, first arose in order to make the national provenance of ships easily 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Holdsworth, The History of English Law Vol. II, p224 
18 See for instance, Jickling, Nicholas (Customs Officer), A Digest of the Laws of the Customs 
Comprising a Summary of the Statutes in Force in Great Britain and Its Foreign Dependencies Relating to 
Shipping, Navigation, Revenue and other matters within the cognizance of the officers of the Customs, from the 
earliest Period to the 53 Geo. III inclusive, Part II (London: No. 41, Pall Mall, 1815). For a discussion of 
the importance of customs records to Revenue collection, as customs duties provided a more reliable 
source of income than excise taxes or Parliament, see Mary Poovey, op cit., at 126.
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identifiable and legally verifiable.19 As Thring points out, “[s]hips, by international 
law, are for the most purposes considered as a portion of the territory of the nation 
to which they belong”20, and thus the legal identity of the ship’s paternity was 
essential to secure commerce, and to determine “without difficulty which ships are 
subject to our municipal laws and regulations.”21 The system of registration for 
British ships became a precondition for enjoying the privileges afforded British 
seamen. Moreover however, it also provided a means of making the title and 
transfer of ships much more efficient in an increasingly globalised system of trade. 
Thring, writing a memorandum that was published in 1854, addressed the 
similarities between the two types of registry, that of shipping and those proposed 
for real property:  
 
It is the more important to look at the law determining 
the rights to ships in this general point of view [the rights 
of owners as established by English law], as the 
registration of real property, now so much discussed, 
rests on precisely the same principles, and the same rules 
might, with certain modification of details, accommodate 
the migratory character of shipping and the fixity of land, 
be applied to both species of property.22 
 
 
The logic underlying this argument that property, whether fixed or mobile, landed 
or seaborne, could be governed by the same type of system of registration rests on 
the assumption that despite their differences, the realisation and use of their value 
as commodities required a system that would allow for maximum amounts of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Henry Thring, “A Memorandum of the Merchant Shipping Law Consolidation Bill; Pointing Out and 
Explaining The Points in which The Existing Acts Are Altered (London: George E. Eyre and William 
Spottoswoode (HM Stationary Office) 1854) p.4-5 
20Thring, p.4 
21 Ibid, p.5 
22 Ibid, p.9 
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security in trade and exchange. From the late 16th century, a variety of different 
mercantile and commercial devices such as double-entry book keeping23, trade 
agreements, commercial sales contracts, and precise records of price and value 
were generalised across fields in order to produce a “general logic of contractual 
exchange.”24 Paraphrasing Pottage, registration was a key device utilised to codify 
and rationalise the fictive and abstract quality of property.25 This is evidenced by 
the use of registration across a range of fields during the 19th C, including life 
insurance26 and patent law. 
While particular technologies of exchange, such as the bill of exchange to 
take one example had been in existence for centuries27, it was deployed within what 
Baucom, following Pocock and Arrighi, have called novel structures of knowledge 
that emerge from the 17th century onwards. At the heart of a system of credit that 
was re-tooled to fit the needs of exchange in a burgeoning capitalist system, were 
“both a theory of knowledge and a form of value which would secure the credibility 
of the system itself… Central to that theory was a mutual and system-wide 
determination to credit the existence of imaginary values.”28 Baucom examines the 
centrality of slavery to the increasingly widespread use of the insurance contract. 
And argues that both operates as techniques of financialisation. The value of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1998) 
24 William Pietz, “Material Considerations: On the Historical Forensics of Contract” Theory, Culture 
and Society 19 5/6, p35 at 42 
25 Pottage, p.383 
26  Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and Risk in America (Boston: Harvard 
University Press, 2012) p.99.  
27 “The bill is one of the oldest instruments of credit in the world, and we can trace its origins far 
back in classical history. Thus in the fourth century BC, Greeks made use of bills. That credit 
standing and the value of a good name were already well understood is instanced by a story by 
Herodotus. Writing three generations after the failure of one Glaucus to honour a bill in defiance of 
oracular advice from Delphi, Herdotus describes him, his descendants, and even any of his house, as 
being ‘utterly extirpated from Sparta.’” (The Bill of London: or, the Finance of Trade by Bills of Exchange 
(published for Gillett Brothers Discount Company Ltd) by Methuen and Co 1952, pp1-5 
28 Baucom, Spectres of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery and the Philosophy of History (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2005) p.18-19. I have explored this in much more detail in “Property, Law, 
Race: Modes of Abstraction” (2014) Irvine Law Review.  
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insrance contract, like that of the life of the slave, was fictitious in the sense that 
they would only be confirmed at some future time. Baucom persuasively argues 
that  exchange based on a system of credit and debt required a collective act of 
imagination and trust; faith in the promise of money value. As I will explore below, 
these imaginary or fictitious values related not only to commodities whose money 
or exchange value was yet to be realised (whether it was a parcel of land or a slave) 
but lay at the basis of the racial taxonomies that were integral to the constitution of 
new and emergent forms of property. 
The 18th and 19th centuries witnessed massive transformations in the concept 
and regulation of property. A commodity logic of abstraction increasingly informed 
processes of propertisation in a range of fields.29 While contemporary theorists (and 
ethnographers) of ownership practices have ably and amply demonstrated how 
such practices can contradict, subvert or challenge the idea that possessive 
individualism is the primary if not the only mode of organising property relations, 
my focus in this article is the legal form of property. In other words, while particular 
communities may find ways of subverting a logic of possessive individualism in 
terms of how they use and relate to property ownership within discrete arenas and 
everyday practices,30 the overarching juridical form that structures and constitutes 
property ownership remains one that is governed by the exchange logic of the 
commodity form. The problem with failing to adequately theorise the relationship 
between the commodity form of property and it’s “social” or “identity” dimensions 
is that the material basis of producing property and the subjectivities which emerge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For instance, Jonathan Levy, op cit. a life insurance registry was created in the state of 
Massachusettes in 1858, the same year the Torrens system was brought into being (p.99); for a 
discussion of how abstraction was a presumption to understandings of the process of patenting 
in the realm of intellectual property see Pottage and Sherman, Figures of Invention: A History of 
Modern Patent Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) pp138-39 
30 See for instance, N. Blomley Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the Politics of Property (New York: 
Routledge, 2004). 
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in relation to it become detached from one another. One consequence of this move 
is that the material basis of the social effects of property ownership are rendered 
illegible31, and the term ‘property’ effectively replaces the term ‘identity,’ relegating 
the concept of property to use as a metaphor.  
 This is not to say that property as a concept is not much more expansive 
than the life it lives within legal practices and doctrine.32 However, I want to 
suggest that for the most part, the symbolic, cultural and social connotations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For example, in Cooper and Herman’s article, “Up Against the Property Logic of Equality Law: 
Conservative Christian Accommodation Claims and Gay Rights” (2013) Feminist Legal Studies 
Volume 21, Issue 1, pp61-80 the authors acknowledge that a “commodified and fungible” form of 
property cannot be separated in a clear-cut manner from how property works to “constitute and 
form” relations of belonging (p.68). However, their analysis of social property seems to be 
premised upon this separation. As a result, the ways in which modern property law (in its 
commodity form) shapes and determines the constitution of legal subjects falls outside of their 
analytical frame, recasting several major interventions into the social effects of property logics in 
non-materialist terms. Of significance to my argument is their reading of Cheryl Harris’ path-
breaking article on “Whiteness as Property” 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1716–21 (1993). Harris’ 
concept of whiteness as a form of property is rendered in terms of “asymmetrical power 
imbalances,” where whiteness “gives power to certain subjects” (p.68); a reading which 
diminishes the novelty of Harris’ argument, which is that whiteness comes to function as an 
analogue of property based on a commodity logic rooted in chattel slavery and later transposed 
into standardized concepts of racial value. The material basis that produces whiteness as a form 
of property (along with an ideology of white supremacy), and significantly, the material effects 
of this transmutation which are both central to Harris’ argument, is effectively diminished in 
their discussion of whiteness as a form of “social property”. 
32 Margaret Davies makes a distinction between property theory and property law and argues that 
“the concept and the manifestations of property in the Western liberal context go far beyond 
legal doctrine, extending to ideologies of the self, social interactions with others, concepts of law, 
and social concepts of gender roles and race relations.” (Margaret Davies, Property: Meanings, 
Histories and Theories (London: Routledge, 2007) p2, 24) Property as a cultural phenomenon is 
seen as separate and distinct from property as a legal phenomenon (p.3). However, there is a 
tension in Davies’ work between speaking of property as something greater than legal concepts 
of property and the repeated recourse to the legal discourse of property throughout the book. 
For instance, in the second chapter, Davies argues that the use of property as a metaphor to 
describe the cultural and symbolic dimensions of subjectivity cannot be directly or causally 
linked to its legal form (p.26). While I certainly agree with this, I think it is essential to 
acknowledge and excavate the relationship between legal concepts of (self) ownership and its 
cultural or symbolic dimensions. In asserting a separation between the material basis of property 
(and thus, it’s legal form broadly construed) and its cultural and symbolic effects, or, in using 
property as a metaphor, the material consequences of property ownership and dispossession are 
occluded. Thus her analysis of Skeggs obscures a crucial point – that the accumulation of 
cultural capital by bourgeois subjects does not only render those who lack this capital as 
“symbolically disadvantaged” (29) but crucially has material consequences in the loss of job 
opportunities and class mobility. While I agree that property as proprietary enters into the 
construction of social identity “regardless of whether we are owners” or not, the propertied basis, 
which must necessarily be historicized, of social identity construction has very real material 
effects in the form of loss or denied opportunities for access to capital and all that it subtends 
(political power, full and equal citizenship, etc…). In my view, it is in exposing this relationship 
between the material and the symbolic, cultural and social that the political potency of using 
property as an analytical framework to critically engage social relations of race, class, gender and 
sexuality lies.  
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property have a material basis. Particular attributes, or properties that attach to 
political subjects (for instance, sexual identities or racial difference) are imbricated 
within relations of exchange and ownership; these attributes attach to the legal 
subject as one who is self-owning. C.B. MacPherson’s concept of the possessive 
individual, based on his reading of Hobbes, Harrington, and Locke, is central to 
this analysis. The emergence in the 17th century of a market society inaugurated a 
concept of the subject who was defined primarily through his self-possession, 
defined by his capacity to alienate his labour in the market place, and his ostensible 
freedom from reliance on others.33 In a marketized, capitalist economy, the traits or 
qualities that attach to property owners, such as respectability and propriety come 
to function as property interests in themselves, with their own exchange values that 
shape social, legal and kinship relations (consider for instance, consideration for 
legally enforceable marriage contracts of the 18th and 19th centuries). Cheryl Harris 
has illuminated how the system of chattel slavery, based on the ownership of black 
slaves and an ideology of white supremacy, produced whiteness as a form of 
property in and of itself, one protected by law.34 After the abolition of slavery, 
whiteness as a form of property maintains its value in a racial society and political 
economy that initially saw the convict-lease system and now, the prison system, 
institutions both central to a “racialised statecraft,”35 flourish. Slavery and colonial 
dispossession constitute the pre-history of MacPherson’s possessive individual, who 
could not exist outside of a system of exchange based on racial capitalism.36 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1962) 264 
34 Harris, op. cit, and see note __. Of particular relevance is her discussion of Plessy v Ferguson (1886) 
163 U.S. 537  
35 Avery Gordon, “The Prisoner’s Curse” in Towards a Sociology of the Trace (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2010) 17-57 at 17; see Angela Y. Davis, Are Prisons Obsolete? (New York: 
Seven Stories Press, 2003) 
36 For an analysis of ‘racial capitalism’ see Cedric Robinson, Black Marxism: The Making of the Black 
Radical Tradition (London: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); for a critical discussion of 
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order to discover the relationship between property’s material basis and its social, 
cultural or symbolic effects, a materialist method of legal analysis, or one that 
focuses on legal form, is indispensable.  
 The theory of the legal form offered by Pashukanis is particularly apt for 
understanding how land became commoditised from the 17th century onwards. This 
is because Pashukanis critiques the empty formalism of neo-Kantians such as 
Kelsen,37 theorising law as a form based on the actual, real operation of law and 
legal relations.38 Thus, a legal form analysis draws our gaze towards the 
mechanisms, in this case, title by registration, that were developed in order to 
transform land into private property in its modern, commodity form. Pashukanis 
analysed the central role that law plays in structuring and facilitating relations of 
exchange and the regulation of labour, resulting in a theory of law as a form rather 
than as a system of norms and rules, or conversely, as ideology.   
  Of central significance to the theory of legal form elucidated by Pashukanis 
is the relationship between the subject of law and property. While anything that 
approaches a satisfying or fully fleshed out theorisation of property in Marx’s 
Capital eludes us, Pashukanis’ focus on the close relationship between the legal 
subject and the commodity form places property at its centre. The transition from 
feudal to capitalist social relations brought into being an abstract legal subject who 
was defined by his capacity for self-ownership.39 Whereas possession in the 
broadest sense, including relations of subservience and dominance, was 
“inextricably bound up” with property, perhaps especially prior to the emergence of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
C.B. MacPherson’s notion of possessive individualism in the context of settler colonial property 
relations see Brenna Bhandar, “Regimes of Exile: Identity, Property and the Status of First 
Nations women in Canada” (2014) feminists@law (forthcoming).  
37 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (London: Pluto Press, 1989) 51 
38 For discussion of this point see China Miéville Between Equal Rights: A Marxist Theory of International 
Law (London: Pluto Press, 2005) pp77-84 
39 Pashukanis, op cit, 110-111; and see Marx, “On the Jewish Question” in Early Writings trans. D.  
McLellan (London: Penguin, 1972); and see discussion of C.B. MacPherson, above at p.___ 
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modern forms of property,40 the legal subject of capitalist relations of exchange and 
ownership assumes the illusory mantle of equality in its status as an abstract legal 
subject.41  
The emergence of modern landed property becomes the “basis of the legal form 
only when it becomes something which can be freely disposed of in the market.” 42 
Property, in the hands of legal subjects defined through their self-ownership, 
provides the fertile soil for a world to be made through the logics of ownership, 
alienability and exchange. The Marxist critique of the cunning of abstraction 
reveals how the commodity form congeals multiple forms of use value, the various 
types of labour involved in producing, cultivating, tending to the land (or scientific 
invention, or coats, or hats for that matter), into a “material shell of the abstract 
property of value.”43 In masking these different forms of labour and use, the 
commodity logic of abstraction obliterates pre-existing relations to the land, and 
pre-existing conceptualisations of land as something other than a commodity. The 
legal form renders invisible (and severely constrains) the ways in which people live, 
act, (re)-produce the conditions of their existence, and relate to one another in 
ways not confined to commodity relations of ownership and exchange44.  In the 
words of Pashukanis, the “concept of property loses any living meaning and 
renounces its own prejuridical history.”45 The legal form imposes its homogenous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Pashukanis, op cit. 110. 
41 Pashukanis, op. cit, 114, 119. 
42 ibid 
43 Pashukanis, op cit, p.112 
44 For an insightful analysis of the feminist critiques of this Marxist theory of law, which obscures 
forms of labour that fall outside commodification, such as reproductive labour in the home, see 
Ruth Fletcher, “Legal Form, Commodities and Reproduction: Reading Pashukanis” in Feminist 
Encounters with Legal Philosophy Drakopolou ed. (London: Routledge, 2013). Fletcher presents a 
cogent and critical re-appropriation of Pashukanis’ theory of law in the context of valuing 
women’s labour in the realm of reproductive biotechnology. See Pashukanis, op cit. p110 
45 ibid, p.122 
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time on the title document held in the registry, or the patent registered in the Patent 
Office, and condenses multiplicity into a singular figure of the owner.  
So far, this rendition of Pashukanis may seem familiar to anyone with a passing 
acquaintance with the commodity-form theory of law. What is of significance in the 
argument presented here, however, is the importance of the colony in the 
development of the legal techniques that facilitated this transition to modern landed 
forms of property. From Ireland in the 17th century, to South Australia in the 19th 
or Mandate Palestine in the 20th century, the abstractions of property as a legal 
form are best understood by grasping the social and historical processes through 
which they are brought into being, a point that Marx makes in the first pages of the 
Grundrisse. The legal form of property works to naturalise modern private property 
relations, rendering illegible all pre-existing relations of use and ownership; this is 
more easily realised in places where the inhabitants are deemed by the force of law 
as something less than civilised (defined of course, in spectacularly circular 
reasoning, by the absence of private property). The treatment of the landless during 
the long period of enclosure in Britain, premised on a similar logic to the 
racialization (and criminalisation) of indigenous peoples in the colonies, may 
certainly be viewed as having established the ideological grounding for what 
followed elsewhere.  
The practices of abstraction find their philosophical ground in the work of 
Locke, Bentham, J.S. Mill and others, who had reconceived of land ownership as 
based not on hereditary titles and inheritance (birthright), but on labour, 
expectation and security. In the work of Bentham, we see an abstract notion of 
ownership not based on physical possession, or occupation. Primary to the 
property relation is law, which secures the property relation, or guards and protects 
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the expectation.46 Title by registration can be seen, then, as the ideal form for 
articulating and representing this abstract notion of ownership.  
However, in addition to emphasising the essence of ownership as being, for 
Bentham, rooted in expectation, it is equally as important to understand the 
centrality of security to this notion of ownership. Law’s raison d’être for Bentham is 
security. The expectation of being able to use and exploit one’s property hinges on 
this ability to be free from the imposition of others’ interests, be it the state 
authorities or arbitrary powers. Further, the law must protect the owner from the 
needs of others, and work to diminish the fear of loss by any other means. The fear 
of losing one’s property arguably functions as an expression of a fear of losing 
civilisation altogether. Savagery, defined by the lack of respect for property law, is 
that which property law must guard itself against.47 In another instance of 
tautological reasoning, the “beneficent genius” that civilises savagery is Security.48  
The figure of the Savage runs throughout Bentham’s theorisation of 
property.  He extols the acts of William Penn, who landing upon “the savage 
coasts” (and in an account that utterly lacks plausibility, I might add) established a 
colony with other “men of peace”, avoiding bloodshed.49 North America is a place 
of savage nature prior to its colonisation and cultivation50; the rulers of the 
Ottoman Empire a bunch of “barbarous conquerors”51; and governments of the east 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Possession and occupation precede this shift, this transformation that marks the commodification 
of land, and eventually do not provide a justification for ownership. However, possession 
remains central to the lifeworld of property; notions of privilege and entitlement shape the 
contours of one’s consciousness, based on the possession of particular qualities and 
characteristics that once constituted the pre-requisites of one’s ability to own. See Cheryl Harris, 
op cit. For an analysis of how possession also remains central to property relations in settler 
colonies such as Canada and Israel/Palestine, see Brenna Bhandar, “Possession, Occupation and 
Settler Colonial Property Relations” (2015) History of the Present: A Journal of Radical History 
(forthcoming) 
47 Jeremy Bentham, p.120 
48 Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation pp118-119 
49 Bentham, p.118 
50 ibid, p.117 
51 ibid, p.116 
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inflicted with “oriental despotism”52. The language of primitivism conflates with a 
racial discourse of savagery and tribal life, both defined by the absence of 
property.53  
 
ii: Emplacement outside of the space & time of English land law 
 
The law is terrified of an empty space. The 
land invites me to ownership. It thirsts for a 
master. Kant and Hegel have shown that the 
status of the will postulates the privative 
appropriation of all nature. (Bernard 
Edelman, 1979, p.42) 
 
 
Edelman’s personification of law as a creature terrified of empty space can be read 
in a few different ways. One is as a reflection of a capitalist imaginary in which the 
wilful subject is naturally drawn to appropriation, where the land seduces potential 
masters through its sublime, threatening beauty. The empty space, in this 
imaginary, is one in which property relations have not yet been established; and 
thus, things could go in any direction. There is no assurance, nothing to secure 
appropriation, no guarantee of ownership. There could be multiple and overlapping 
forms of use, different temporalities at play, functioning in the form of communal 
use based on practices, memory, histories, that are embedded in the topography of 
the land. The land, which is perhaps a symbol of a feminised presence, is not under 
the control of a male proprietor. Terrified of such heterogeneity, disdainful of what 
it sees as unproductive or wasteful, the law uses force to impose a system of 
ownership that secures what Bentham referred to as “habitual ideas of property;” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 ibid, p.89 
53 ibid, p.113 
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the expectation that one should own what one appropriates, possesses, labours 
over, or uses.54 These ‘habits’ of property however, are for Bentham natural rather 
than cultivated, as a more contemporary sensibility would understand them to be. 
In the context of South Australia the fear of an empty space was pre-empted 
through securitising the land to facilitate settlement.  In other words, the space was 
filled with law at a distance, before physical settlement began in earnest, in order to 
secure the future.55 
The mode of settlement of the colony of South Australia illuminates both the 
financial dimension of colonization and the centrality of the operation of terra nullius 
to colonial settlement; two factors that were, I argue, quite intimately related to one 
another. The land, infamously claimed by the Crown on the basis that it was 
uninhabited, was sold to settlers before their arrival. The Colonization 
Commissioners for South Australia note that by 1839 (3 years after the first settlers 
had landed on the cost of St. Vincent’s Gulf) 250,320 acres of public land had been 
sold for the sum of 229, 756 pounds. The customs and licence duties added a 
further yield in revenue of 20,000 pounds per year.56 The enabling legislation that 
established the Colonization Commission provided that the surveying of the land 
was to be funded by a combination of the advanced purchase of public lands in 
South Australia (35,000 pounds), and a further 20,000 pounds raised “on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Bentham, 154 
55 Of course, the practicalities of settling this space and creating the conditions for capitalist 
production presented massive challenges given the absence of working class. Marx wrote of 
Wakefield and his discovery that “capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons 
which is mediated though things”.55  One Mr. Peel arrives in Western Australia with a handsome 
of capital and “3000 persons of the working class…” but is left without the primary element for 
capitalist production: wage workers. With land so abundantly available, English colonists had to 
be inventive in procuring classes of workers for the burgeoning settler colony. With his typically 
acerbic wit, Marx writes: “Horror of horrors! The excellent capitalist has imported bodily from 
Europe, with his own good money, his own competitors! The end of the world has come! No 
wonder Wakefield laments the absence both of relations of dependence and feelings of 
dependence on the part of the wage-labourers in the colonies.” Marx, Capital Vol.I (London: 
Penguin, 1990)  p 936 
56 Fourth Annual Report of the Colonization Commissioners For South Australia, p.3. 
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security of its future revenues and un-appropriated lands.”57 Thus the survey of 
land was funded not by the British colonial government, but by private individuals 
and the South Australian Company who bought “unexplored land” that was 
destined for settlement.  After much exertion by the Commissioners, 437 
preliminary land orders for 135 acres each (comprised of 134 acres of rural land, 
and 1 acre of town land) were sold at the fixed price of 12 shillings per acre.58  
Moreover, the Act required the Commissioners to raise a guarantee fund “by 
raising a loan upon the security of the probable revenues of a proposed settlement, 
the site of which was yet unknown.”59 They were authorised to raise a loan for up 
to 200,000 pounds at an interest rate not exceeding 10 percent per annum. The 
money borrowed was to be a charge upon the revenue, or the monies received from 
duties and taxes levied in the colony; the unsold lands as collateral.60  The Act 
further provided that a portion of this loan would be invested in Government 
securities, to protect the ‘mother country’ from any liabilities that might result in 
the course of colonisation.  
Colonial settlement was thus privatised from the very beginning, with the 
techniques of finance capitalism, such as speculative investment on futures, funding 
the colonial venture.  What is also very clear from the enabling legislation is that 
the land was viewed, even prior to settlement, as a fungible commodity to be used 
to both finance settlement through its sale and speculatively, as collateral for 
securities. This mode of colonisation reflected a concept of property imbued with 
the characteristics of the commodity form, abstracted from any pre-existing social 
relations or use, even before the arrival of the settlers. It also reflects the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 ibid p.4 




spatialisation of capital; South Australia was produced as a space of colonial 
settlement through the use of land for financial speculation.61  
 The anxiety created by a space imagined to be empty and unpopulated by 
law was thus quieted through the use of land as financial collateral. Once 
propertised in this way however, land ownership still augured fear in relation to the 
insecurity of title. Prior to a system of registration, the sale of land was based on 
contractual principles.62 The seller had to produce each and every deed of 
conveyance (going back as far as possible) to show the purchaser a good chain of 
title. Of course, one of the major defects with this system is that “not every interest 
in the land was created by or recorded in the deeds forming the chain of title”; the 
same held for interests created outside the frame of conveyancing (such as 
inheritance).63 In other words, even the most thorough searching of the title deeds 
did not always provide sufficient security for prospective purchasers. In light of 
this, contracts for sale and purchase of land reflected an amalgam of title deeds and 
local knowledge of the land.  
 
Given that the formal ideal of a good root of title was 
often unattainable, contract formation became a practical 
art, which referred only obliquely to the theory of 
conveyancing. In practice, conveyancing was an exercise 
in evaluating the plausibility of a paper title against 
practical senses of property which had arisen from land 
use, and which lay in local memory or in the memory of 
an estate inventory.64  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Henri Lefebvre’s insight that “capitalism and neo-capitalism [produce] an abstract space that is a 
reflection of the world of business on both a national and international level, as well as the power 
of money and the politique of the state” seems quite apt here. Henri Lefebvre, State, Space, World: 
selected essays ed. N. Brenner and S. Elden, trans. G. Moore, N. Brenner and S. Elden 
(Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), p.187 
62 And, I suspect, trust between individuals who were attached to others through social and kinship 
relations.  
63  Stein and Stone, Torrens Title (London: Butterworths, 1991) 4 
64 Alain Pottage, “The Measure of Land” (1994) Modern Law Review,  p.363 
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Pottage explores in depth how the system of conveyancing that preceded the 
introduction of registration relied upon “a local sense of place and property”.65  
Prior to the cartographic mapping of the country, which happened at different 
moments throughout the 19th century66, boundaries were determined and identified 
by reference to natural or local landmarks, and what Pottage calls “a logic of 
localised practice.”67 This local knowledge was gradually codified with the 
emergence of mapping from the 16th century onwards68, and Pottage illuminates 
both the emergent techniques of cadastral mapping and the significance of the 
transposition of ownership signified by the memory of lived, social experience to 
ownership signified by paper held in an administrative archive, the registry.69  
The defects with the contractual system of conveyancing were many, and 
reiterated at length throughout the 19th century as members of the British 
Parliament repeatedly attempted to introduce local registries of titles, and 
ultimately, a national system of title by registration. As noted above, the greatest 
defect with the system was considered by many to be the insecurity of title.70 As the 
Commissioners stated, “[i]n all civilized countries, the Title to Land depends in a 
great measure on written documents...”.71 They go on to detail all of the 
circumstances in which every material document may not be produced, and even in 
cases not involving fraud, as noted above, there may be interests that were not 
conveyed in a deed.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Ibid, 365 
66 See Tithe Commission and Ordnance Survey; First Report of the Registration and Conveyancing 
Commission  PP (1850) XXXII 
67 Ibid. 366 
68 Pottage, “The Measure of Land” p.366 
69 Pottage, “The Measure of Land” 
70 The Commissioners of the Second Report on Real Property 1830 note that the “most important 
evil [of the existing system of conveyancing] is the insecurity of Title”. p.4	  
71 ibid, p.3 
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It is important to note that the system of title by registration implemented in 
1925 was not introduced ex nihilo. A system of registration existed in Scotland as 
early as the 17th century.72 For some of the reasons explored above, many attempts, 
from as early as the 16th century onwards, failed in the English context.73 The logic 
of registration begins to emerge, as noted above, with the shift to an increasingly 
commoditised vision of the land. Local county registries and a fledgling one in 
London itself emerged in the 1860s74 but it would take until 1925 for the system to 
be imposed in a definitive and compulsory manner throughout England and Wales. 
Thus, the legal profession and other opponents of the system of registration were 
not abruptly defeated but land law reformers won the day gradually, and notably, 
as I ague here, sometime after the Torrens system had been introduced in various 
British colonies.75 
Robert Torrens, in introducing the Real Property Bill in the South Australia 
legislature was somewhat more dramatic about the evils of insecurity 
accompanying conveyancing. After citing the pecuniary loss involved in procuring 
a good title, he said:  
 
But the pecuniary loss is not the worst feature. The harassing, spirit-
wearing perplexity in which the land-owner is too frequently involved is 
yet more distressing… How many purchasers for bona fide 
consideration, having parted with their money, pass their days in 
anxiety and bitterness, dreading lawsuits, eviction and ruin. (South 
Australia Parliamentary Debates, June 4, 1857, p.202)  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 The Registration Act 1617 provided for a system of registration of land in Scotland. 
73 Brian Simpson, An Introduction to the History of land law (1961) 254 
74 Offer, op cit. p.69 
75 As noted below, the Torrens systems was introduced in the colony of British Columbia in 1870, 
and a system of land registration was introduced into Ghana (or the Gold Coast as it was known 
at the time) in 1883. See Patrick McAuslan, Bringing the Law Back in: Essays in Land, Law and 
Development (Abingdon: Ashgate, 2003) 74. See also footnote 8.  
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The problems of conveyancing reiterated in the colonial context, which do not at 
any point acknowledge the presence of aboriginal communities on the land (which 
at a minimum may have at least constituted a ‘problem’ for the security of title) 
reflect a degree of non-recognition that is truly revealing of the meaning of terra 
nullius. 
The second perceived defect with the system of conveyancing was the cost 
involved. The perusal of title deeds and related investigations into the land, the 
lucrative preserve of lawyers, was indeed expensive and this proved particularly 
onerous in the colonies, where the initial outlay of expenses to obtain land were 
high. In the colonies of New South Wales and South Australia, immigrants would 
first purchase ‘land orders’ that they could sell on the private market. Speculation 
became rife, and with an especially transient settler population in the early days of 
settlement, problems relating to the insecurity of title were exacerbated.  
The imposition of the Torrens system of registration was explicitly intended, 
like all registries, to provide greater security to title-holders.  In order to identify 
the parcel of land represented on the title document with sufficient precision, 
surveying and cadastral techniques of mapping became indispensable. The 
surveying and mapping of land rearticulated it in entirely different terms 
(temporally, spatially and materially) from what existed prior to the mapping 
exercise. As I explore below, in the context of South Australia, the vision of the 
land as literally empty of any prior claims or use meant that mapping and surveying 
the land had far less importance than in England, or even in the context of the 
colony of British Columbia. 
A great deal of scholarly work has been done on mapping, examining its 
emergence as a surveying technique of appropriation and a mode of knowledge 
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production. Mapping currently constitutes an extremely significant and valuable 
means of resisting hegemonic ways of seeing particular political conflicts, and 
representing economic networks of production and commodity circulation.76 In the 
specific context of land titling, Pottage argues that the move to registration 
effectively reduces land to paper. Abstraction lay at the basis of this reduction: 
“Registration extracted land from the network of relations and understandings 
which formed the ‘local knowledge’ of different communities, relocated it on an 
abstract geometric map, and deciphered it according to a highly conventionalised 
topographic code.”77 
The surveying and mapping of territory was certainly an integral dimension 
of implementing a system of title by registration, and more significantly, effacing 
pre-existing ways of knowing and using the land. Surveying and mapping of 
territory had particular force in relation to agricultural labourers in the English 
context, and indigenous communities in the colonial settler context whose 
relationships to land were to be dramatically suppressed, literally buried under the 
vision of colonial surveyors.78 In South Australia, however, Torrens argued that 
mapping was not a necessary precursor to the registration of title, because in new 
colonies the size and boundaries of new estates were constantly changing and being 
created. Quoting from the Real Property Commissioners’ reports he noted that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 See for instance An Atlas of Radical Cartography (Los Angeles: The Journal of Aesthetics and 
Protest Press, 2009) With regard to spaces of political conflict, particularly as regards struggles 
over land ownership, mapping provides a key means of representing different visions and 
understandings of possession and dispossession. In Israel/Palestine for instance, nearly every 
NGO, UN body, and Israeli state agency produces maps prolifically and continuously in order 
to literally chart the appropriation of land, the construction of the Separation Barrier, the 
position of checkpoints, and the growth of settlements. Maps and mapping are thus key 
components in the struggle over representing the conflict.   
77 Pottage, “The Measure of Land” p.363; and see Pottage and Sherman Figures of Invention: A 
History of Modern Patent Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) for a novel discussion of 
how abstraction (and Marx's labour theory of value) were central to modes of propertisation in 
the development of patent law doctrine, particularly chapter 2.  
78 See Cole Harris Making Native Space: Resistance, Colonialism and Reserves in British Columbia 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002) 
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“[o]ne of the witnesses  has observed in his evidence that ‘A map is a good servant 
but a bad master; very useful as an auxiliary, but very mischievous if made 
indispensable.’”79 The necessity of procuring maps as a prerequisite for a system of 
registration was thus a contested issue in South Australia. “The grant or certificate 
of lands contained a diagram of the land, drawn accurately and to scale, and a 
verbal description of the parcels and of the parties entitled.”80 And as I have 
outlined above, surveying and mapping was not carried out on a large scale prior to 
a vast number of sales of parcels of land being sold prior to settlement.  
The benefits of the Torrens system lay for the most part in the security it 
would provide prospective purchasers, and also, the ease with which land could be 
alienated. Given the way in which land in the colony was viewed prior to 
settlement, it is no surprise that Torrens agued that this system should have been 
implemented “at the planting of these colonies when lands were first granted from 
the Crown.”81 In anycase, the other rationale for adopting the system of registration 
lay in the temporal break from the vestiges of aristocratic land holdings that the 
colony of Australia afforded.  
Key sites of resistance to the system of registration were lawyers and an 
aristocracy who were not inclined to make the alienation of their vast estates any 
easier. As Stein and Stone note, in 1833, “24 peers in the realm of England each 
held estates in excess of 100,000 acres.”82  Torrens critically addressed the 
aristocratic stranglehold over the land very incisively when he wrote: 
 
The class immediately affected (the landed gentry of 
England) are proverbially averse to changes in existing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Torrens, 13 
80 Torrens, 19 
81 Torrens, 22 
82 Torrens, 11 
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institutions; the genius of conservatism is opposed to any 
such radical reform as would leave to diminish the 
obstructions which tend to preserve the hereditary acres 
in the old lines of descent.83 
 
Legal historian Offer emphasises the resistance of the legal profession to a system 
of title by registration.84  
  In noting the resistance of the landed gentry to a system of title by 
registration, one should resist concluding that they were not using their vast estates 
to engage in speculative financial ventures. The far-away plantations in the West 
Indies which serve as the backdrop for Austen’s Mansfield Park85 and indeed, for 
Bentham’s own speculations on the nature of ownership in his Theory of Legislation 
were emblematic of the enormous amounts of capital invested in the slave trade, 
plantations, and land speculation throughout the Empire. The social-cultural 
significance of land that developed during the feudal era, however, did not diminish 
with the long transition to a capitalist economy. As Sugarman and Warrington 
note: “In the strange, half-timeless world of the traditional English landed estate, 
feudal concepts blissfully lingered long after feudal relations had been eradicated.”86 
In a compelling analysis, the authors show how the equity of redemption, a core 
device in the law of mortgages, was utilised to protect the rights of landholders 
from the encroachments of capital, while at the same time, “fostering the extension 
of commercial contracts sustained by credit.”87 The resistance amongst the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Torrens, pp.6-7 
84 See Offer, Property and Politics 1870-1914: Land Ownership, Law, Ideology and Urban Development in 
England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 
85 For a critical reading of the colonial and imperialist dimensions of Austen’s Mansfield Park, see 
Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage, 1993), ch.1 
86 David Sugarman and Ronnie Warrington, “Land law, citizenship, and the invention of 
“Englishness: the strange world of the equity of redemption” in Early Modern Conceptions of 
Property eds John Brewer and Susan Staves (London: Routledge, 1996) 111-143 at 111 
87 ibid, at 112. See also Philip Girard, “Land Law, Liberalism, and the Agrarian Ideal: British North 
America, 1750-1920” in eds. MacLaren, Buck and Wright  Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in 
British Settler Societies (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005) 120-143 at 131  
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aristocracy to a system of title by registration that would render land more easily 
fungible was thus consistent with the paradoxical nature of the uses of landed 
property during this period: its value as social-cultural capital remained 
undiminished, while it was simultaneously retooled to facilitate emergent financial 
forms of capital investment and speculation. 
For Torrens, the colony of Australia was a space unencumbered by the 
social relations of aristocracy, by history, by a past. The colony of Australia as a 
terra nullius provides a space for a radical break with the political and legal 
inheritance of England. “Here feudal tenures- the source of all the complication- 
never had existence.”88 Contrary to the assertion made by Povinelli that the English 
carried the “prior” with them in the very substance of English property law89, it is 
clear that the primary objective in the reforms sought by Torrens and his 
supporters was to begin anew, and the doctrine of terra nullius provided the means 
and justification for creating this new system of ownership in the colony. 
 Aboriginal communities in Australia were not consigned to a time of the 
prior; and significantly, nor were English property-owners. The specific concept of 
ownership that is imposed had as its primary objective to displace the concept of 
the prior, and prior ownership, from the juridical sphere. Perhaps the most radical 
aspect of a system of title by registration is that it renders all prior ownership claims 
irrelevant. Title by registration precludes any consideration of what was there 
before. This is more akin to a logic of elimination, radically negating what was there 
before, based on the doctrine of terra nullius. Coupled with this erasure of 
indigenous interests was the desire to shed the weight of English land conveyancing 
and the aristocratic stranglehold over forms of land ownership, in order to 	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89 E. A. Povinelli, “The Governance of the Prior”interventions Vol. 13(1), p.13 at 20 
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implement a new system of registration of title. The retrospective recognition of 
Aboriginal communities’ prior presence on the land comes much later; but to assert 
that a governance of the prior arrives in Australia with the colonists is to mis-
characterise the nature of property ownership that was imposed in South Australia 
in the form of the Torrens system. Torrens, like Bentham, rejected Blackstone’s 
rather more romanticised vision of English property law, as evidenced by the 
quotation that opens this article. Blackstone’s concern with how colonists ought to 
deal with the existence of prior legal relations amongst indigenous communities at 
the point of colonial encounter reflects his overarching preoccupation with how to 
theorise the transition from natural law conceptualisations of ownership to more a 
rational scientific basis, which he attempted to construct in the Commentaries. In 
other words, the existence of prior legal relations in the state of nature presents a 
logical problem for Blackstone’s objective of creating a rational science of law, 
more than an ideological concern with modes of governance or the legitimacy of 
colonial sovereignty.  
The bifurcation of issues relating to aboriginal peoples from considerations 
of property law in several different archival sources (Reports of the Colonisation 
Commissioners, legislative debates of the South Australia parliament, and colonial 
correspondence) make it clear that the land was viewed as a commodity entirely 
divorced from the people living on it. Aboriginal peoples were an inferior race, 
blackfolks to be displaced and corralled into reservations, educated, civilised and 
protected by the Crown. It is often argued that because the land was viewed as terra 
nullius, the colonists were able to impose a system of private property ownership in 
Australia. However, it seems that this misses the significance of how the land was 
viewed, and the prevailing concept of property held by the colonists even prior to 
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settlement. The discourse of savagery makes aboriginal rights to their land a non-
question, and the doctrine of terra nullius facilitates the materialisation of this vision 
of the land as free and fungible.  
Armed with a battery of new concepts grounded in the political philosophy 
of the Utilitarians, an English government desirous of colonisation, and deep-
rooted resistance to a transformation in the existing modes of land ownership and 
conveyancing in England, the colonists were able to push forward radical reforms 
in land law. The ultimate violence of abstraction that lay at the basis of the 
proposed rationales for the imposition of the Torrens system was that land was 
deemed to be vacant, a tabula rasa. The relationship between a colonial ontology 
(based on a racial taxonomy) and property ownership was thus central to this 
process of transformation. Abstraction as a central modality of propertisation was 
not just based on changing justifications and conceptualisations of ownership, as I 
have explored above, but on an abstract fiction that posed a continual threat to 





As I have argued, the commoditisation of land required a system of ownership that 
would facilitate exchange without the bothersome encumbrances of the past, of pre-
existing relationships to the land, and with the maximal amount of security for 
owners as possible. The settler colony of South Australia afforded English settlers a 
place where they could experiment with a system of registration that had been 
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resisted in England and would not be fully implemented ‘at home’ for another sixty 
years.  
The concept of terra nullius, or vacant land, was based on a racist discourse 
of the civilised and non-civilised, with civilisation being signified by private 
property ownership, the cultivation of land, modes of governance, and social 
organisation.90 Ironically, while the racist underpinnings of the doctrine of terra 
nullius have been repeatedly disavowed by contemporary courts in the context of 
aboriginal rights litigation, aboriginal title is persistently defined in relation to the 
same Anglo-European norms and concepts of property ownership that were the 
basis of indigenous dispossession.  However, dispossession was not, as I have been 
arguing in this article, simply a matter of racist notions of civilised and barbaric 
peoples. Dispossession was both a prerequisite and a consequence of the co-
production of racial value and property ownership, rendered possible by a logic of 
abstraction that was central to emergent capitalist forms of property, its modern 
legal form, and the racial subjugation of indigenous peoples, their lands and 
resources. 
The emergence of a capitalist economy that was based on the exploitation of 
colonies required new forms of knowledge. Baucom has referred to the novel forms 
of knowledge that accompanied the economy of exchange and trade in slaves as a 
new episteme. The 18th and 19th centuries mark a moment when human life and 
property are imbricated in relations of exchange to the extent that one stands in for 
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the other. This is a moment when the meaning of the word stock is rendered 
ambiguous; referring to cargo that is inanimate, slaves that become property like 
any other, and animal livestock. It is a time when the term specie refers both to 
money and slaves, a species of property that is utilised as a stand-in for currency.91 
While the histories of the trans-Atlantic slave trade are clearly germane to the 
formation of property and racialised indigenous subjects in the U.S., they are 
somewhat less directly of import to the colonial settler contexts of Australia and 
Canada. 
Nonetheless, the fact of blackness certainly was a live and material concern 
in the Australian context. Indigenous communities, referred to as blackfellas from 
the time of colonial settlement onwards, were marked and identified as a vanishing 
race. Certainly this racial identification was related to a myriad of radical 
differences between them and the colonists, and blackness no doubt was among 
them. So while aboriginal bodies were not commoditised in the same way as those 
of African slaves, I argue that the logic of abstraction was still at play here; racial 
difference was quantified and measured as a property that could be bred out. The 
pseudo-science of blood quantum figured significantly in colonial policies on 
Aboriginal peoples in Australia.   
Racial science during the 18th and 19th centuries, to some degree, was 
influenced by the inauguration of the science of natural history92, and subsequent to 
that, the shift to the modern science of biology. The development of measurement 
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John Hopkins University Press, 2011) 
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and quantification93 as the primary techniques utilised to taxonomise and classify 
life forms was globalised, in the making of what Mary Louise Pratt has termed a 
“planetary consciousness.”94 Linnaeus first classified human beings according to a 
racial taxonomy divided into four categories, determined by geography: 
Americanus, Europaeus, Asiaticus, and Africanus.95 Pratt argues that Linnaeus’ 
project of classification extended to the colonial world in a way that relied upon the 
same navigational mapping utilised to “search for commercially exploitable 
resources, markets, and lands to colonize…”96 Shoring up and producing a “world 
historical subject” who was “European, male… and lettered,” Pratt’s work provides 
something between a supplement and corrective to Foucault’s analysis of 18th 
century natural history which, as she notes, “[does] not always underscore the 
transformative, appropriative dimensions of its conception.”97 
Linnaeus and Cuvier in the 18th century questioned the basis for 
classification that had preceded the classical age, namely, resemblance, similarity 
and difference.98 Whereas racial difference was in the period prior to the 18th 
century defined primarily in relation to visible physical traits and differences, this 
framework shifts from the 18th century onwards with the burgeoning discourse of 
racial science. Race (and the racial superiority of white Europeans) came to be 
grounded in something other than theological precepts of the God-given 
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sovereignty of the Christian races over others; rather, the measurement of skull 
size99, the segregation and displacement of peoples based on the measurement of the 
quantum of ‘black’ or ‘Aboriginal’ blood100 that bodies carried as a result of their 
biological and ancestral inheritance, served to justify dispossession in settler 
colonial contexts.101  
Race became a defining feature of human life. Racial science relied on 
emergent concepts of classification, yet also “escaped from that critical relation…”. 
In writing about scientific conceptualisations of life in the classical age, Foucault 
writes: 
 
[Life] escapes – which means two things: life 
becomes one object of knowledge among others, and 
is answerable, in this respect, to all criticism in 
general; but it also resists this critical jurisdiction, 
which it takes over on its own account and brings to 
bear, in its own name, on all possible knowledge.” 102 
(emphasis added) 
 
Racial science, a way of taxonomising life itself, comes to bear on forms of 
knowledge across fields: economy, politics, philosophy.103 At the same time, 
subjects relegated to the lower strata of systems of racial classification resist this 
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jurisdiction and bring different forms of knowledge and critical practices of 
resistance to bear across this very same terrain.104 
If racial science was reliant upon larger scientific developments in 
philosophies of life itself, one might well speculate about the ways in which 
prevailing notions of race as biologically grounded come to bear on forms of 
knowledge central to capitalist relations of exchange. This is precisely the point that 
O’Malley makes when he argues that racial knowledge was used to fix value in 
relation to currencies, which, during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, lacked 
any fixity of value. Abstracted from the actual lives of non-European peoples, 
blackness and indigeneity, came to signify a lesser value not only in relation to 
white European settlers, but with respect to relations of ownership. Relatedly, Pratt 
notes how Linnaeus’ system of classification for humans explicitly posited the 
European subject as superior, but in such a “strangely abstract, unheroic gesture” 
so as to render this racially charged and ideological taxonomy quite harmless in 
appearance.105 The logic of abstraction serves the interests of commerce and 
colonisation, with a natural history of man that charts racial difference in a 
taxonomy that standardises notions of white European superiority.  
In the settler colony of South Australia, racial science produced a scene of 
violent dispossession and displacement.106 The taxonomy of racial classification that 
accompanied the imposition of the systems of land ownership across various types 
of colonies becomes clear by contrasting the way in which Aboriginal communities 
and Indians are viewed by the Australian colonists. Searching through a variety of 
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South Australian Legislative Council on Wednesday January 27th 1858. Moved by 
the Honourable Mr. Morphett was a motion to present to her Majesty the 
“sympathy and feelings of this Council in reference to the insurrection in India.” 
They were referring to of course the Indian Mutiny of 1857, which is often 
understood as symbolising the  beginnings of  the nationalist, anti-colonial 
movement.  The Members of the Legislative Council duly noted their upset and 
quibbled over whether their sentiment ought to be backed up by something more 
material, such as horses for the British cavalry or financial support. The other 
affect that is expressed, and more significant for my purposes here, is 
disappointment, and vicarious shame at the “disgrace which [the Sepoys] had 
heaped upon themselves, knowing how gallantly those regiments had formerly 
fought when under the command of British officers.”107  
The Sepoys were rebellious colonial subjects, but were more in need of 
stronger authority and discipline, which their British colonial masters would 
undoubtedly provide, than anything else. This horrid warfare was to be roundly 
condemned, and with perceptible melancholia, some Members of the Legislative 
Council  lamented that during the time they had served as British officers in India, 
it was evident that very few of the native soldiers could be depended upon for 
loyalty.  
This is in stark contrast to the way in which Aboriginal communities are 
described in correspondence between Lieutenant-Governor Arthur and HM's 
Secretary of State for the Colonies relating to Aboriginal communities living on 
Van Diemen's Land (today known as Tasmania). Although the correspondence 
covers an earlier period, around 1831, the contrast is dramatic. Aboriginal 
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communities are described as “predatory hordes,” as “partially civilised” and as 
“abject beings” (Dispatch No.1) The “tribes of savages” (Dispatch No.2) are 
described as though they are another species altogether, driven by an insatiable 
“love of plunder” (Dispatch No.7). The only remedy for those with an inherently 
“savage spirit” is expulsion from settled areas, and eventually, extermination.  
While the history and settlement of South Australia is vastly different from that of 
the penal colony of Van Diemen's Land, the discourse of the 'vanishing race of 
Aborigines' was certainly pervasive throughout Australian colonies. 
What I am gesturing toward, and by way of conclusion, is the racial 
taxonomy that marked black Aboriginal bodies as abject and capable of expulsion. 
This abstract notion of the irredeemable Savage accompanied the vision of their 
lands as free of encumbrance; malleable and capable of being shaped into a new 
commodity form that embraced the mercantile and marine logic of registration as 




 Scientific abstractions that were utilised to confirm the pre-existing 
European belief in the inferiority of the black racial subject, and a commodity logic 
of abstraction both worked together to produce aboriginal lands as ones that were 
imagined to be free, fungible and uninhabited. This vision of the space of the 
colony, outside of the time and space of English relations of ownership were central 
to the imposition of a particular system of land ownership in the colonies. However, 
it is also essential to acknowledge that the argument offered here does not account 
for this history of confrontation between the English and Aboriginal communities 
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nor Aboriginal resistance during the early part of settlement and thereafter. My 
account is not intended to suggest that the specificities of colonisation were not rife 
with contradiction, negotiation, and also, the recognition of Aboriginal jurisdiction 
over particular matters, criminal, civil and otherwise. As many scholars have 
recently argued, colonial sovereignty as expressed through jurisdiction reflects a 
long period of settling108, and the continued presence of indigenous laws presents 
possibilities for moving towards decolonised, shared jurisdictional spaces.109 
 Another aspect of the colonial encounter not explored in this article is 
aboriginal resistance to the imposition of settler colonial property relations. Irene 
Watson has written powerfully of raw law, “the still-existing, living, breathing” law 
of First Nations in Australia.110 The persistence of raw law despite attempts to 
obliterate it attests to the failure of the colonising mission embedded in the 
imposition of the English common law (and indeed, as Watson argues, international 
law). Similarly, Audra Simpson points out that colonialism “in its settler form” has 
failed to fulfil its objective: to eliminate First Nations through the appropriation of 
their lands and assimilation into a white-dominated body politic.111 
A useful trajectory of questioning would be to consider how the logics of 
abstraction were utilised, and perhaps even necessary, in order to secure colonial 
sovereignty. What was the nature of aboriginal resistance to colonial settlement 
that forced English colonial administrators to fix racial value in the way that they 
did in Australia and elsewhere? How did Aboriginal communities resist racial 	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classification, and the horrors of residential school education inflicted upon 
children who were variously classified as “full-blood”, “half-blood”, or “quadroon”? 
The devastating consequences of the transposition of English property law 
to settler colonies for indigenous communities continue today, as English property 
norms remain the central referents in defining what can be recognised as aboriginal 
title.112 Placing the effects of dispossession at the forefront of their analyses, many 
post-colonial legal theorists have rightly focused on the racist (and gendered) 
underpinnings of the international law doctrines and property laws that were used 
to appropriate native land.113 In doing so, however, some aspects of the 
transformations in conceptualisations of property and changes in the nature of 
ownership that emerged from the 18th century onwards have become obfuscated. 
English property ownership is indeed a mode of lawfare in the colonies; however, 
the development of law in the colonies was unfolding in the context rife with a 
mixture of encounter, conflict, recognition, and brutal dispossession, affecting the 
legal consciousness of both coloniser and colonised. In considering the 
contemporary use of registering ownership as a means of formalising property 
rights in impoverished communities, strenuously advocated by Peruvian economist 
Hernando de Soto as a means of advancing a development agenda, it is clear in the 
eyes of his critics that such programmes have not necessarily increased access to 
credit among the poor, and has led to an increase in the hours of labour performed 
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outside the home.114 In the Australian context, and the Northern Territory 
specifically, proposals to convert communally held land by Indigenous communities 
(land that has been restored to its owners through the use of the Native Title Act) 
into property held in fee simple by individuals (converting, essentially, native title 
to title held by by registration) has met with criticism on the grounds that it will not 
necessarily improve the economic and material conditions of Aboriginal 
communities located in remote areas.115 The legal form of property continues to 
function as a means of fashioning particular kinds of legal subjectivity (the owner, 
the consumer, the debtor) through the specific technique of title by registration. 
A different but no less important question to pursue is to what extent the 
development of the system of title by registration in the colony of South Australia, 
and then, the colony of British Columbia, influenced the development of the system 
of title by registration in England. To what extent were the colonies used as legal 
laboratories, testing grounds, for legal reform of property law in England? While 
the centrality of property law to colonisation has been remarked upon widely, the 
relationship between settler colonialism and the transformation of English property 
law has received far less attention.  
 A conclusive answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article. 
However, we do know that Sir Robert Richard Torrens did travel back to England 
in 1863, and made several speeches and submissions to various Commissions 
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dealing with the question of title registration.116 While English law reformers insist 
that the system of title by registration finally implemented in the 1925 legislation 
bears no relation to the Torrens system, many contemporary scholars assert that 
there are few differences.117 Perhaps to acknowledge how lawyers, judges and law 
reformers’ awareness of the system’s successful implantation in the far-flung 
corners of Empire would have caused too much strain on the prevailing notion of 
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